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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this appeal is based on Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j), as amended, 1989.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the lower court abused its discretion in

determining that 90 days was a "reasonable time" within which to
measure Appellee Robbins1 damages, especially when there was a
bond, the conversion was willful and knowing, and Appellants'
admitted "lulling" of Mrs. Robbins continued uninterrupted beyond
such 90 days.

In other words, whether it is "reasonable" for the

Appellants to allegedly investigate Mrs. Robbins' claim beyond 90
days yet, at the same time, it is not "reasonable" to measure
Mrs. Robbins' damages under the Appellants' own standards.
(a)

Standard of Review.

The standard of review is

simply whether the lower court abused its discretion in assessing
$l-5/16ths per share as Mrs. Robbins' damages.

See_ p. 13, bott.,

p. 14 of Appellants' brief in which it is admitted that such
determination is within the trial court's sound discretion
(citing Mullen v. J.J. Quinlan & Co., 195 N.Y. 109, 87 N.E. 1078,
1080 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div., 1909); Fulley v. Wasserman, 319
Pa. 420, 179 A. 595, 598-599 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1935); Pacific
Development Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748, 751 (Utah
1948)).

See also 40 ALR 1285.
2.

Based on Mrs. Robbins' one-third/two-thirds

contingency fee agreement with her counsel, whether the lower

-1 -

f court abused its discretion in awarding her additional damages of
one-third (l/3rd) of her partial summary judgment as reasonable
/^Attorney's fees.

(Ex. 2 hereto; R. 818-823.)

Saying it another

way, in an effort to make Mrs. Robbins whole, whether the lower
court was justified in determining that what Mrs. Robbins is
required to pay her attorney constitutes additional damage. As
set forth below, the issue is not whether the lower court awarded
Mrs. Robbins attorney's fees as sanctions because it never did.
This is clear from the record.

Further, because the attorney's

fees issue as stated by Appellants was never asserted in the
lower court, it is not properly before this Court on appeal.
(a).

There is no review, thus, no standard of review,

for an issue raised on appeal for the first time.

Bangerter

v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
There are no determinative Constitutional provisions
relative to the Old Republic, Atlas, and Check Rite's separate
appeal.

This is not to ignore that relative to Mrs. Robbins' own

cross-appeal, various "determinative Constitutional provisions"
are identified.

See p. 2 of Mrs. Robbins' brief dated August 27,

1991.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(a) Nature of the proceedings.

This appeal singularly

involves the proper measure of damages for conversion of a
chattel having a fluctuating value, in this case, the publicly-

-2-

held securities of Appellant Check Rite.

As a result of the

lower court's determination that Mrs. Robbins was entitled to
damages of $l-5/16ths per share, Mrs. Robbins obtained summary
judgment on Counts I and II of her amended complaint, claims for
wrongful refusal to transfer securities and conversion.

See

Exhibit "A" to Mrs. Robbins' cross-appeal brief; R. 69-114.
(b) Course of' pjsoGeed-ings-^nd disposition below.

The

parties acknowledged Atlas and Check Rite1^ liability on Counts I
and II and submitted the issue of measuring Mrs. Robbins1 damages
to the lower court.

(See the parties' memorandums in support of

their respective cross-motions for partial summary judgment; R.
310-326 and R. 351-378.)

The lower court made such determination

and granted Appellee Robbins partial summary judgment.

Exhibit 1

hereto; R. 710-712.
Mrs. Robbins was further awarded a separate judgment for
attorney's fees.

Exhibit 2 hereto; R. 818-823. This

determination was based on the contingency fee arrangement
Mrs. Robbins has with her counsel.

See Exhibit 2 hereto.

Appellants Old Republic, Atlas Stock Transfer and Check Rite then
obtained Rule 54(b) certification to appeal the two judgments.
(R.

842-844.)

This appeal, including Mrs. Robbins' separate

cross-appeal relative to the dismissal of Counts III, IV, and v
of her amended complaint, has ensued.

-3-

RELEVANT FACTS
In the interests of non-duplication, Mrs. Robbins
incorporates by reference her statement of Relevant Facts
contained on pp. 3-11 of her cross-appeal brief on file herein
dated August 27, 1991. All that Mrs. Robbins can add is that her
damages on Counts I and II were established by her own
affidavits, the affidavits of Chuck Burton, Penny Grace, Potter
Investment Company and Ernest Muth, each of which is attached
hereto respectively as Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 (R. 389-392,
413-416, 379-380, 387-388, 381-383, 384-386).

Such affidavits

were unrebutted by Old Republic, Atlas, and Check Rite.

In

addition, since Old Republic, Atlas and Check Rite could not
rebut Mrs. Robbins' supporting affidavits, they resorted to the
tactic of moving the lower court for an order striking such
affidavits.

(R. 426-427.)

At the same time, Old Republic, Atlas

and Check Rite failed to explain why such affidavits should be
stricken, leaving it to the lower court to ferret such out on its
own.

(See R. 428-431, Appellants' supporting memorandum and

R. 576-578, Mrs. Robbins1 opposing memorandum.)
lower court denied Appellants' motion to strike.

Regardless, the
(Exhibit 1

hereto; R. 710-712, 13, p. 2 thereof.)
Lastly, however, the Appellants, in a last ditch effort
to defeat Mrs. Robbins' motion for partial summary judgment,
filed, on March 5, 1990, a tardy opposing affidavit of Paul S.
Guardalabene (R. 518-523).

There is no dispute that such

-4-

affidavit was "untimely" under Rule 4-501(1)(b), Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.1

Accordingly, Mrs. Robbins made a

motion to strike such affidavit, a motion the lower court
apparently found unnecessary to rule upon.

(R. 583-589, p. 4

thereof.)
Regardless of its inability to assist the Appellants,
the Guardalabene affidavit ironically supports the lower court's
ruling.

This is because if Guardalabene (i.e., Old Republic)

acted "reasonably" in investigating the matter for over 90
days —

something to which he attests —

the "reasonable time"

within which to measure Mrs. Robbins' damages must necessarily be
just as long.

Simply put, in investigating her claim, one

certainly cannot expect Mrs. Robbins to have acted more
"reasonably" than the very entities upon whom the claim is made.
Based on the foregoing, the lower court properly held
that Old Republic, Atlas and Check Rite can't have their cake and
eat it too.

That is to say, Appellants cannot maintain that it

is perfectly "reasonable" for Guardalabene to take over 90 days

1

Not only was the Guardalabene affidavit filed late under Rule 4-501 (1)(b) but
the exhibits thereto were separately filed over two months later on May 24, 1990. See R.
651-691. Nonetheless, the Guardalabene affidavit, which is meaningless at best, created no
genuine issue of material fact necessary to defeat summary judgment on the issue of
damages or otherwise. Guardian State Bank v. Humphreys, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 762 P.2d
1084, 1087-88 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 1988); Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co., 105 Utah
Adv. Rep. 18, 772 P.2d 693, 695 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 138 Utah
Adv. Rep. 6, 9, 795 P.2d 1127 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 1990)(statements in an affidavit not contradicted
by the other parties must be accepted as uncontested facts for purposes of summary
judgment).

-5-

investigating Mrs, Robbins1 claim, but Mrs. Robbins cannot have
the same leeway in measuring her damages.
Relying upon Mrs. Robbins1 several unrebutted supporting
affidavits, the lower court held that approximately one week less
than 90 days after May 4, 1989, was a "reasonable time11 within
which to measure Mrs. Robbins1 damages.

Because the unrebutted

evidence of the highest price of Check Rite stock during that
period was $l-5/16ths per share, the lower court awarded Mrs.
Robbins a money judgment on that basis.

(Ex. 1 hereto;

R. 710-712.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellants Old Republic, Atlas and Check Rite contend
that the lower court erred in determining that $l-5/16ths per
share is the proper measure of Mrs. Robbins1 damages.

At the

same time, it is undisputed that this figure is the highest price
Check Rite stock attained within 90 days after May 4, 1988, the
date of Atlas1 letter to Mrs. Robbins announcing that it was
keeping her stock certificate.
amended complaint.

See Exhibit "J" to Mrs. Robbins1

As set forth below, there are several

recognized ways of measuring damages for conversion of chattels
having a fluctuating value, any one of which results in the same
conclusion:

in this case, $l-5/16ths per share is proper.

See

Brougham v. Swarva, 661 P.2d 138, 143-44 (Wash. App.
1983)(listing the various recognized ways of measuring damages
for conversion of chattels having a fluctuating value).

-6-

Appellants argue that the so-called "New York Rule"
exclusively applies to this case and that, under such rule, 90
days after May 4, 1988, is not a "reasonable time."

Yet as

admitted in Appellants' brief, the "reasonable time" rule is
designed to give the injured party the time and opportunity to
determine what to do. Appellants1 brief, p. 11.

In this case,

the very admitted and undisputed conduct of Old Republic (i.e.,
Guardalabene) justified extending any shorter "reasonable time"
simply because Guardalabene himself investigated the matter for
well over 90 days.
investigation.

In fact, Guardalabene never did complete his

Further, Mrs. Robbins was told that she didn't

have to do anything during the 90 day period other than
apparently wait for Guardalabene to complete his investigation.
See Mrs. Robbins1 affidavits, Exhibits 3 and 4 hereto.

Thus, the

Appellants are barred by their very own conduct from arguing that
a "reasonable time" should be any less than 90 days.2
In addition, it would be against public policy to assess
a "reasonable time" in this case at any less than 90 days.

This

is because it would encourage those like Old Republic, Atlas and
Check Rite to purposely stall claimants for a period beyond 10 or
30 days in order to make the very arguments they are now making

z

Saying it another way, how can over 90 days be "reasonable" for professionals
like Appellants but less than 90 days is not "reasonable" for a lay person like Mrs. Robbins?
If one puts oneself in Mrs. Robbins' shoes, how should she have acted differently?
Furthermore, in deferring to Old Republic, Atlas and Check Rite, the converters, are stuck
with the consequences of Old Republic's action (or inaction).

-7-

before this Court.

The law must be flexible and attentive to the

nuances of each case:

a "reasonable time" depends on the facts

and circumstances of each case and in this case, 90 days, the
time period during which Guardalabene (Old Republic) negotiated
directly and continuously with Mrs. Robbins in bad faith, is
"reasonable."3

If 90 days is not a "reasonable time" based on

the existence of a bond and the undisputed conduct of
Guardalabene and Atlas, then insurance companies and their
obligees can merely delay the resolution of a similar bond claim
beyond a shorter "reasonable time" in every instance, thus,
hoping that claimants like Mrs. Robbins will eventually get
tired, disappear, or otherwise compromise themselves.4
Appellants1 willful, knowing and ignoble conduct is
wrong and it should not be rewarded.
p. 144.

Brougham v. Swarva supra at

On the contrary, all the Appellants had to do was go in

the market and buy Mrs. Robbins 8,000 shares of replacement stock
when she first made her claim.

This is not to ignore that by

virtue of the bond, Mrs. Robbins had no independent duty to
somehow hurry and mitigate her damages as contemplated in the

3

See Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Company, 309 F.Supp. 548, 565 (D.C. Utah
1970)("What a 'reasonable time' may be will vary from case to case.").
4

No doubt that had the price of the stock stayed the same after the conversion
and then started to increase substantially in price after 90 days, Appellants would
themselves be arguing before this Court that 90 days is a "reasonable time." Thus, had it
benefited them, and, based on Guardalabene's alleged inability to "get to the bottom" of the
matter within at least 90 days, the Appellants would surely be arguing that 90 days is a
"reasonable time" within which to measure the damages in this case.

-8-

various "New York Rule" cases exclusively relied upon by
Appellants, particularly when it is undisputed that no one told
her to do so.
Finally, respecting the issue of attorney's fees, the
lower court awarded attorney's fees as part of Mrs. Robbinsf
partial summary judgment damages.

This is evidenced by the very

language of such judgment and the exhibits attached to it and
incorporated by reference.

See Exhibit 2; R. 818-823.

The same

is further evidenced by the lower court having ordered Mrs.
Robbins to divulge her agreement with counsel —
partial summary judgment award.

after the

(R. 800-801, Minute Entry.)

There is simply no evidence in the record that the lower court
awarded attorney's fees as sanctions.

To be sure, Mrs. Robbins

never argued that she was entitled to attorney's fees on that
basis (R. 351-378, p. 22 thereof and R. 754-778).5

At the same

time, the Appellants never argued that Mrs. Robbins wasn't
entitled to attorney's fees because the same is tantamount to
sanctions (R. 439-449).

Moreover, after arguing over what the

attorney's fees should be and, after discovering Mrs. Robbins'
agreement with counsel, the parties in effect stipulated to the

5

In support of the court's award of attorney's fees, Mrs. Robbins attached a
complete copy of South San Pitch Company v. Pack, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44-45, 765 P.2d
1279 (Ut. Ct. of App. 1988). See R. 775-778. In South San Pitch, the Court of Appeals held
that attorney's fees can, under certain limited circumstances, be awarded as an element of
a party's damages.
-9-

amount of attorney's fees to be awarded.6

Furthermore, the lower

court specifically denied a separate motion made by Mrs. Robbins
for sanctions.

(Ex. 1 hereto; R. 710-712, 16 thereof.)

Thus,

the argument that attorneyfs fees were awarded as "sanctions'" is
frivolous.

The same is also raised on appeal for the first time.

Accordingly, this issue, as argued by Appellants on pp. 21-24 of
their brief, cannot be considered.

Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson,

Inc., 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21,

P.2d

(Ut. Ct. of App.,

August 14, 1991)(failure to raise issues below precludes raising
them on appeal); Bangerter v. Poulton, supra at 102.7
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING
THAT $l-5/16ths PER SHARE IS MRS. ROBBINS" DAMAGES.
The only issue before this Court —
could not agree on —

an issue the parties

is the proper measure of damages for

conversion of chattels having a fluctuating value.

Specifically,

what is the appropriate measure of damages for the intentional,

6

The record evidences that Mrs. Robbins initially sought $10,000 in attorney's
fees. (Exhibit 3 hereto, * 3 , p. 2 bott., R. 390; R. 351-378, p. 22 thereof; R. 754-778.) When
the Appellants disputed such amount and were able — with the lower court's assistance —
to discover Mrs. Robbins' agreement with her counsel (R. 800-801), the parties agreed in
open court that one-third of the partial summary judgment or some-$4,000 was the proper
amount to be awarded. This is because, based on Mrs. Robbins' agreement with counsel,
Exhibit "A" to Exhibit 2 hereto, Mrs. Robbins would not be out-of-pocket any more than
one-third of the partial summary judgment or approximately $4,000.
7

See also R. 782-789, pp. 3-6 therein, Defendants' Objection and
Memorandum in Opposition to Award of Attorney's Fees in which Appellants admit that Mrs.
Robbins is entitled to attorney's fees for prevailing on Counts I and II.
-10-

knowing and willful conversion of and wrongful refusal to
transfer Mrs, Robbins1 8,000 shares of of Check Rite stock?
Jurisdictions are split on the measure of damages for
conversion of property having a fluctuating value.

Brougham

supra at p. 144. There is an even greater split depending upon
whether the conversion was willful and knowing.

Id.

Ironically,

however, using any one of the several recognized ways of
measuring the damages in this case, the result is the same:
appropriate amount is $l-5/16ths per share.

the

Thus, any way one

cares to look at it, the lower court was correct.
A.

One recognized measure of damages is the highest

price of the stock between the date of conversion and the date of
trial.

According to the undisputed facts, such is $l-5/16ths per

share and therefore, the lower court was correct.
Reference is made to 40 ALR 1282 which discusses damages
for conversion of property having a fluctuating value.

In

Bennett v. Tucker & Pennington, 20 Ga. App. 288, 123 S.E. 165,
166 (Ga. Ct. of App. 1924), the court recognized the right to
recover in trover the highest value between the date of
conversion and trial.

In this case, Mrs. Robbins1 stock was not

converted in good faith.

The conversion was intentional or as

the result of culpable negligence.

To be sure, by virtue of the

bond, there is no excuse for either Defendant Atlas or Check Rite
not going into the market and immediately buying Mrs. Robbins
replacement stock.

It is further undisputed that Defendants

-11 -

Atlas, Check Rite, and Old Republic had notice that the stock was
proceeding to increase in price up to and through the beginning
of August, 1988.

(See Ex. 7 hereto, Affidavit of Potter

Investment Company and Exhibit "L" to Mrs. Robbins* amended
complaint.)
Unlike cases relied upon by the Old Republic, Atlas and
Check Rite —

cases which do not involve a bond —

this is not,

by any means, a case of innocent or inadvertent conversion and
therefore, the foregoing measure of damages applies.

Cases

further hold that if a trespass is willful, fraudulent, or under
circumstances imputing negligence to the trespasser, thus showing
that he is indifferent to the rights of others, and in cases of
property of a fluctuating value, the plaintiff, at his option,
may sue and recover upon the basis of the highest intermediate
value to the date of trial.

Burmarsal Company, Inc. v. Lake, 272

S.W. 582, 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).8
Based on the theory of continuing conversion, the
measure of damages would include a time period up to and until at

8

There is but one occasional difficulty with this measure, and it occurs only if
the property, after a long time, is still in the possession of the defendant. In Ingram
v. Rankin, 47 Wis. 406, 32 Am. Rep. 762, 2 N.W. 755, 764 (Sup. Ct. Wis. 1879), the court
stated that in those cases where the market value is very fluctuating, great injustice would
be done by this rule to the man who honestly converted such property, in the belief that it
was his own, if, after the lapse of five or six years, he should be called upon to pay the
highest market value it had obtained during that extended time. Such is not the case here
because in this case we are talking about a time period of less than ninety (90) days after
the willful and knowing conversion, a time period in which Appellants disingenuously claim
that they — not Mrs. Robbins ~ didn't know what to do. Further, there is no dispute that
Appellants did not convert the property "in the honest belief that it was their own." Id.
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least the first part of August, 1988.9

The theory of continuing

conversion occurs only in cases in which the property remains in
the possession of the defendant subsequent to the conversion.
This is because in the event the wrongdoer has parted with
property to another person, the conversion ceases and passes to
that next person.

In this case, Defendant Atlas still maintains

possession of Certificate 258 and it has refused to issue and
deliver Mrs. Robbins a replacement certificate.

In doing

absolutely nothing and in further shirking its responsibilities
by misdirecting Mrs. Robbins to Old Republic, Defendant Atlas has
also profited from its own wrongdoing.10
In Devlin v. Pike, (N.Y. 1874) 5 Daly (New York Common
Pleas Reports) 85, the court stated that if the property at the
time of trial is of greater value than it was at the time of the
conversion, and the defendant is still in possession of it, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover its increased value at the time
of trial.

In Gowan v. Wisconsin-Alabama Lumber Co., 215

Ala. 231, 110 S. 31, 33 (Sup. Ct. Ala. 1926), an instruction was
approved that, if the jury believed that the timber converted had
a fluctuating value, they were authorized to find for the

y

For a list of authority that the measure of damages is the highest price
between the date of conversion and the time of trial, see 48 ALR 1301. See also 87 ALR
818, a supplement to 40 ALR 1282.
10

In fact, to date, Defendants Atlas and Check Rite are out-of-pocket
nothing. This is because under the terms of the open penalty indemnity bond subject of this
case, Old Republic has been paying all their attorney's fees.
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plaintiff for the highest value as shown by the evidence, with
interest from the date of conversion.

Accord:

Young v. Corbitt

Motor Truck Company, 148 S.C. 511, 146 S.E. 534, 544
(Sup. Ct. S.C, 1929) (damages are highest value up to the time of
trial with interest thereon).
There is no dispute that the highest price the stock
reached between the alleged date of conversion and today (i.e., a
date prior to any prospective trial) is one dollar and fivesixteenths cents ($l-5/16ths) per share.

Accordingly, the lower

court's judgment, which embraces this amount, is correct.
B.

Another recognized measure of damages is the highest

price of the stock between the date of conversion and notice of
conversion, on the one hand, and a "reasonable time" afterwards,
on the other.

Because July end/August beginning 1988 is a

"reasonable time1' after mid-May 1988, the lower court's award of
$l-5/16ths per share is correct.
In Western Securities Co. v. Silver King Consolidated
Mining Co. of Utah, 192 P. 664, 672 (1920), this Court applied
the so-called "New York Rule."11

11

See also Nephi Processing Plant

Mrs. Robbins submits that a strict application of the New York Rule may be
inapplicable to this case. Such rule grew out of New York Stock Exchange cases involving
conversion of customers' securities as in the cases cited by Appellants. Such is inapplicable
to the facts of this case because, not being a customer and the transaction not involving a
sale in the market, Mrs. Robbins was not required to deliver stock to anyone else.
Accordingly, Mrs. Robbins was not under any extraordinary duty or other urgency to
mitigate her own damages as in situations where the converted securities must be delivered
in short order to a third party. Most importantly, however, the cases cited by Appellants do
not involve the existence of an open penalty indemnity bond, a fact which excuses Mrs.
Robbins from being required to do anything other than what she did.
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v. Talbott, 247 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1957).

Under the "New York

Rule," damages are the highest price of the converted property
within a "reasonable time" after the owner has notice of the
conversion.

According to 161 ALR 323, there is no guide under

the New York Rule as to what is a "reasonable time."12

In Mullen

v. J.J. Quinlan & Co., 195 N.Y. 109, 24 LRA (N.S.) 511, 87
N.E. 1078, 1080 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1909), the court held
that where the action was for conversion of stock shares and for
a quantity of wheat, the prices for which, it was alleged, had
increased after the conversion, damages for the conversion would
be based on the highest market value within two (2) months of the
conversion, if such time, under all of the circumstances of the
case was a reasonable one. 13

In Scott v. Rogers, (1864) 31

N.Y. 676, the court held that four (4) months after the
conversion was a reasonable time.

In Scott, quoted at 40 ALR

1285, the court stated:
. . . If it be clear upon the evidence that an
immediate or speedy sale were contemplated, I
think such a fact would contract the limits of
this reasonable period. If it were clear that
months were expected to intervene before a
sale should take place, I see no objection to
extending this reasonable period to a similar
length. If the evidence reflected no light on
the subject, then a reasonable period would
probably be a question of law. . . .

12

See footnote 3 above citing Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur.

13

Therein, the trial court was authorized to determine as a question of law
what constituted a "reasonable time." Mullen at 87 N.E. 1080. See Standard of Review
subsection under Statement of Issues above.
-15-

In May 1988, the market price of Check Rite stock was low and no
sale was either imminent or contemplated as Mrs. Robbins had not
sold her 8,000 shares "short" into the market or to any third
party.

Under the "New York Rule," Mrs. Robbins is entitled to

receive damages of the highest market price which that kind of
merchandise may have reached between the time of conversion and a
reasonable time within which to replace it or bring an action.
[Emphasis added.]

In this case, it wasn't reasonable for

Mrs. Robbins to have replaced such stock on her own prior to July
end/August beginning 1988, because she understood and was
repeatedly informed by Old Republic that, because of the bond,
her predicament would be taken care of.
hereto.

See Exhibits 3 and 4

Is there some reason she shouldn't have believed them?
Furthermore, Mrs. Robbins didn't have the available

resources to effect "cover" even if someone had instructed her
accordingly, which no one did.
thereof.

See Ex. 3 hereto, 16, p. 3

As early as mid-July, Old Republic informed

Mrs. Robbins that it was investigating the matter and based on
such representations, it would have been totally unreasonable for
her to have disbelieved Old Republic and gone around it by filing
suit or attempting to solve the problem some other way.

This is

undisputed.
Ninety (90) days after the alleged date of the
conversion in this case is a "reasonable time" as a matter of
law.

Brougham v. Swarva, supra at p. 144; Gragard's Succession,
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106 La. 298, 30 S. 885, 888 (Sup. Ct. La. 1901)(in determining
damages for conversion of chattels having a fluctuating value,
the owner should be given the benefit of the better price which
prevailed within a few months after the conversion).
Because there was a bond, and, as a result, Mrs. Robbins
was in continuous negotiations with Old Republic, she was not
under a duty to do anything other than what Old Republic was
telling her. If she had an additional duty of some kind, what is
the basis of such?

She had not sold Certificate 258 and didn't

need to deliver 8,000 shares to anyone else.

Any such duty to

"cover," mitigate or replace one's own property is based on the
defendant having sold the converted goods and, at the same time,
the plaintiff has an obligation to deliver the same to a third
party.

Such is not at issue here.

sold by Atlas, Check Rite —
someone else.

Certificate 258 had not been

or even Mrs. Robbins herself — to

Thus, Mrs. Robbins did not simultaneously owe

8,000 shares to a third party.

Based on Old Republic's bond and

the willful and knowing conduct of Old Republic, Atlas, and Check
Rite, Mrs. Robbins acted reasonably.

Brougham supra at p. 144

("The innocent victim should not suffer a loss because of the
wrongful taking and withholding of his property.")
In sum, a "reasonable time" period after the conversion
and notice of conversion should be either tolled or extended to
at least 90 days because of the intentional —
reckless —

if not plain

"lulling" and stalling activity of Old Republic,
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Atlas, and Check Rite.

Because slightly less than ninety (90)

days is a "reasonable time" in this case under the "New York
Rule," the lower court's judgment in Mrs. Robbins• favor is
correct.14
C.

Another recognized measure of damages applicable in

this case is the highest price of the chattel between the time of
conversion and a "reasonable time" thereafter for commencing an
action.

Mrs. Robbins commenced her action with reasonable

diligence and because the highest price of the stock in that
interim was $l-5/16ths per share, the lower court's judgment is
correct.
In Hamer v. Hathoway, (1867) 33 Cal. 117, an action for
conversion of hay, the case was remanded for directions to enter
judgment for the plaintiff for the sum which constituted the
maximum value of the hay between the time of conversion and the
beginning of an action.15

This measure is supported by the more

14

The Appellants rely on Western Securities, supra for the proposition that 30
days is a "reasonable time" in this case. However, such proposition does not follow from
Western Securities. Western Securities involved the conversion of stock in a pledge
situation when the pledgor or borrower wanted the particular collateral allegedly converted
by the lender back in his own possession. In this case, Mrs. Robbins was not a borrower;
Cert. No. 258 was not collateral on a loan; she didn't even want Cert. No. 258 back: she
simply wanted 8,000 shares of free-trading stock. Furthermore, in Western Securities, the
sale of the pledged stock at $1.50 was expressly authorized by the provision of the
promissory note between the parties and the issue in that case only became one of
resolving the appropriate price of the stock after a perfectly proper sale thereof — not
after any alleged conversion. Western Securities supra at p. 673.
15

The same measure was not followed in the case of Page v. Fowler, (1870) 39
Cal. 412, 2 Am. Rep. 462, only because the hay price went up ten times the following year
and trial of the action occurred six years after the time of conversion.
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recent Reed v. White, Weld & Co., Inc., 571 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1978)(holding that if the conversion is willful,
fraudulent or attended with gross negligence, the owner may
recover the highest value between the date of conversion and the
filing of suit).

In this case, there can be no doubt that, at a

minimum, Defendant Atlas was willful, grossly negligent or
inexcusably reckless in not only doing nothing, but in directing
Mrs. Robbins to Old Republic and when it knew very well that it
and Check Rite, not she, were the obligees on the bond.

See also

Imperial Sugar Co., Inc. v. Torrans, 602 S.W.2d 275, 276-77 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979)(where conversion is attended with fraud, willful
wrong, or gross negligence and the property converted is of
changing or fluctuating value, measure of damages is highest
market value of such property between date of conversion and
filing of the suit).
In Hall v. Bache, 235 App. Div. 256, 256 N.Y. Supp. 693,
695 (Sup. Ct. N.Y., App. Div. 1932), it was held that as to
damages for the conversion of cotton, the plaintiff was limited
by the highest price reached between the date of the conversion
and a reasonable time after termination of negotiations between
the parties respecting a settlement.

Accordingly, it was held

that where the last interview between the plaintiff and the
defendants1 attorneys respecting settlement was on March 9, such
reasonable time for the plaintiff's decision expired on March 21
following.

In this case, negotiations between counsel to
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Mrs. Robbins and counsel to Old Republic (Guardalabene)
terminated in December, 1988 —
its highest price —
April, 1989.

months after the stock reached

and Mrs. Robbins brought her action in

Based on this measure, as with the preceding

measures, Mrs. Robbins1 measure of damages is still July
end/August beginning 1988 when Check Rite stock achieved a price
of one dollar and five sixteenths cents ($l-5/16ths) per share.16
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION NOT TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVITS
OF MRS. ROBBINS, CHUCK BURTON, PENNY GRACE AND
POTTER INVESTMENT COMPANY WAS CORRECT. THIS IS
BECAUSE NO BASIS WAS EVER ASSERTED BY THE APPELLANTS
AS TO WHY ANY AFFIDAVIT SHOULD BE STRIKEN AND
NO BASIS EXISTS REGARDLESS.
Appellants1 lower court motion to strike Mrs. Robbins1
several affidavits is legal boilerplate wholly lacking in
substance.

No attempt was made to connect any objection to the

actual text of any such affidavit, thereby indicating to the
lower court why any affidavit is objectionable.
All the Appellants put forth —
whatsoever —

See R. 428-431.

without any basis

is that such affidavits contain "hearsay," "lack

foundation," or contain "legal conclusions."17

For instance,

16
According to 40 ALR 1297, it is a question of law whether an action was
begun and prosecuted with reasonable diligence. At the same time, there can be no dispute
that Mrs. Robbins did indeed prosecute her action with reasonable diligence and therefore,
if one were to apply this measure, the lower court's judgment is correct.
17

Under Rule 104(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, the trial court has ample
discretion to consider affidavits over objections based on either foundation or the
competence of the affiants. McCormick §53; Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, 45-50

-20-

Potter Investment Company sold Certificate No. 258 to
Mrs. Robbins.

Certainly it knows whether Mrs. Robbins bought the

stock from it and whether it alone delivered Certificate No. 258
to her.

Further, the Potter affidavit refers to a conversation

that Mr. George "John" Potter had with Guardalabene, Old
Republic's agent and employee.

The affidavit says nothing of

what Guardalabene purportedly said, and surely Mr. Potter is
competent to testify as to what he talked about or what he said
to Guardalabene.
With respect to the Penny Grace affidavit, Ms. Grace, a
Vice President of the national stock brokerage firm of Thompson
McKinnon Securities, Inc., certainly has personal knowledge of
the price at which she personally sold Check Rite stock to her
own customers. What could possibly be objectionable about
that?

The same is true with respect to the Chuck Burton

affidavit:

he knows what he said to Mrs. Robbins and he knows

the price at which his firm, Fitzgerald, Talman, sold Check Rite
stock at July end/August beginning 1988. How could Mr. Burton
not have personal knowledge of that contained in his affidavit as
well?

Further, since the Burton affidavit attests to a lower

price than that of Thompson McKinnon (Penny Grace), the Burton

(1962). See Federal Rule of Evidence 104. See also Advisory Committee's Note to
Subsection (a), Rule 104, Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183, 196. Furthermore, the
lower court, in considering Mrs. Robbins1 various affidavits, clearly did not consider the
weight of testimony or the credibility of witnesses. Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292,
431 P.2d 126 (Utah 1967); Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978). Thus, the lower
court committed no error in this regard.
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affidavit was primarily submitted by Mrs. Robbins to demonstrate
that she was indeed closely following the price of Check Rite
stock and that had she had a certificate to deliver at July
end/August beginning 1988, she would have sold it.
The foregoing is also true of Mrs. Robbins1 two
affidavits, Exhibits 3 and 4 hereto.

There can be little dispute

that she is competent to attest to that contained in both such
affidavits and that neither contain hearsay.
Mrs. Robbins1 several affidavits submitted in support of
her motion for partial summary judgment, Exhibits 3-8 hereto, are
not in the least objectionable.

Arnica Mutual Insurance

Co. v. Schettler, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 768 P.2d 950, 963-64
(Ut. Ct. App. 1989)(is proper for lower court to assess damages
on the basis of affidavits); Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857,
859 (Utah 1983)(affidavit in support of summary judgment must set
forth facts that would be admissible in evidence).18

Because

Mrs. Robbins1 several supporting affidavits each contain facts
which would be admissible in evidence, the lower court committed
no error in considering them.

18

See also generally D & L Supply v. Saurini, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 775 P.2d
420, 421 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 1989); Bruno v. Plateau Mining Company, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 89, 747
P.2d 1055, 1056-57 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987); Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1192 (Utah 1983). In
addition, recent Utah authority holds that where a party's motion for summary judgment is
challenged by a motion to strike portions of the supporting affidavits, the movant should be
given an opportunity to supplement his affidavit to meet the standards of Rule 56(e) before
the summary judgment motion is ruled upon. Gillmor v. Cummings, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 15,
17, 806 P.2d 1205 (Ut. Ct. of App. 1991).
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POINT III
A LOWER COURT IS NOT REQUIRED TO ISSUE FINDINGS
IN ORDER TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. FURTHER, THE ATTORNEY'S FEE ISSUE, BEING
RAISED ON APPEAL FOR THE FIRST TIME, SHOULD BE IGNORED.
A trial court is not required to issue findings in
awarding summary judgment because it defeats the purpose of
summary judgment.

Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 166 Utah

Adv. Rep. 13, 14,

P.2d

(Ut. Sup. Ct., August 2, 1991).

Naturally, this principle embraces an award of attorneyfs fees on
summary judgment.

Nonetheless, in an ignoble attempt to get this

Court to review the lower court's award of attorney's fees,
Appellants argue for the first time that the lower court awarded
attorney's fees as "sanctions."19

This is not true.

The lower

court based its award of attorney's fees on South San Pitch
Company v. Pack, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44-45, 765 P.2d 1279
(Ut. Ct. of App. 1988) and Nephi Processing Plant,
Inc. v. Talbot, 247 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1957), the latter of
which Appellants themselves ironically rely upon.
Appellants' brief.

See p. 12-13,

Nephi holds that a plaintiff victimized by

conversion is entitled to lost profits, including the cost of
minimizing damages.

Nephi at p. 77 3-774.

19

This would include

In other words, by arguing for the first time that the attorney's fees
awarded are "sanctions", the Appellants are relying on recent case law holding that the
lower court must make a specific finding as to the basis thereof. In this case, the lower
court not only did not award attorney's fees as sanctions but it specifically denied Mrs.
Robbins' motion for sanctions. (Exhibit 1 hereto; R. 710-712,116 thereof.) Thus, there is no
reason why the lower court should have issued findings as to the basis of attorney's fees it
did not award as "sanctions."
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attorney's fees necessarily incurred to be made whole.

As

further contemplated in Nephi such losses are within the
contemplation of the parties to this appeal because Mrs. Robbins
had already made her claim and the Appellants knew that the price
of Check Rite stock was on the rise.

See Exhibit "L" to amended

complaint; see also Potter affidavit.
The contention that the lower court awarded attorney's
fees as "sanctions" is frivolous and wholly unsupported by the
record.

See Ex. 2 hereto.

Because Appellants have manufactured

this issue for purposes of appeal, it should be ignored.

Olson

v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21,

P.2d

(Ut. Ct. of App., August 14, 1991)(failure to raise issues
below precludes raising them on appeal); accord: Bangerter
v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983).
CONCLUSION
The conversion in this case is willful and knowing, if
not fraudulent, particularly when a bond existed solely to
prevent such a conversion.

Old Republic, Atlas and Check Rite

provide no explanation as to why the "reasonable time" in this
case —assuming one applies the New York Rule —
less than 90 days.

should be any

In fact, their figure of 30 days could not be

more arbitrary and "unreasonable."

Old Republic, Atlas and Check

Rite have simply picked 30 days "out of thin air" because it is
the longest time period after May 4, 1988 before the price of
Check Rite stock started to rise.
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Thus, 30 days is only

"reasonable" because it is economical to them.

The New York Rule

is not designed to economically assist the converter.
Based on the foregoing, the lower court's partial
summary judgment in Mrs. Robbins1 favor should be left intact and
undisturbed.
DATED this 3rd day of October. 1991.
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In re:

LeAnna (Broadwater) Robbins v. Old Republic Surety, et
al., Case No. 900508
Appellee (Broadwater) Robbins' Opposing Brief,

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 3rd day of
October, 1991, (s)he hand-delivered or mailed, postage prepaid,
sufficient true and correct copies of the foregoing OPPOSING
BRIEF OF APPELLEE (BROADWATER) ROBBINS by regular mail to:
Hand-delivered:

Mailed:

Robert A. Burton, Esq.
Stephen J. Trayner, Esq.
H. Burt Ringwood, Esq.
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants Old
Republic Surety and Northwestern
National Insurance Company of
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Sixth Floor, Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Larry G. Reed, Esq.
CROWTHER & REED
Attorneys for Defendant Atlas
445 South 300 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phillip R. Hughes, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant Check Rite
884 South 200 East, Suite 100
5alt Lake CiWutah 84fl 11

0200.01:0BRIEF.1-11(F00T.2-3)
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EXHIBIT "1"

Th-cd Jotltcisi District
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

Byr..,,!*

..uj,—J
N-l'&uuiy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Plaintiff,

OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE,
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC., f / k / a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J .
FLETCHER, a Utah resident.

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

The Court having reviewed the file, having heard oral argument on May 1,1990.
including the memorandums and affidavits filed in support of and in opposition to several
motions, the Court being fully advised and good cause further appearing, hereby enters
judgment and further orders as follows:

1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's first and second
causes of action is denied.
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2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II of her amended
complaint is granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants Atlas Stock Transfer and Check Rite International, Inc., in the amount of
$10,500.00 with interest thereon at 10% per annum since July 31, 1988. Pursuant to Rule
54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure plaintiff is hereby awarded costs. Further,
pursuant to §15-1-4, Utah Code Ann., interest shall accrue on this judgment from the date
of its entry at the rate of 12% per annum. The matter of plaintiff's attorney's fees is taken
under advisement and will be ruled upon after the submission of a detailed affidavit in
support of such an award.
3. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for an
order striking the affidavits of plaintiff, Chuck Burton, Potter Investment Company, and
Penny Grace is denied.
4. Defendant Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion to strike
certain portions of plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment and plaintiff's memorandum in support of her motion for partial
summary judgment is granted.
5. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for
summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in her
amended complaint as against them is granted, but any award of attorney's fees is denied.
6. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions against the insurance company defendants
and their counsel is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
DATED this (y*

day of June, 1990.
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In re:

Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, et al.
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Third District Court

Judge Raymond S. Uno

0200:JUDG.l
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EXHIBIT "2"

RLEBLV-* ' *

, -;

Third J_<,; ,..,.. t CsUict
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South. Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

SEP 1 7 1390

D^^wiiy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL.DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S
FEES

LeANNA BROADWATER.
Plaintiff,
v.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE,
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah, ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f / k / a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident.

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

A hearing having been held in the above-entitled Court on September 6, 1990,
at the hour of 9:30 a.m., on the issue of attorney's fees; John Michael Coombs having
appeared for plaintiff Broadwater; Stephen J. Trayner having appeared on behalf of
defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National Insurance Company of
Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Larry G. Reed having appeared for defendant Atlas Stock Transfer;
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no appearance having been made by defendant Check Rite International, Inc., in that its
local counsel claims to have had no notice of the hearing cifiJdftCOi<V$&\
*To\r
|P
C k & c k KlVe U)C\s A/of f»s/cla»«f <jw+K4 tfUi IIIMCJ ^ ^ + I T * C 4 • £.
The Court having heard the arguments of counsel and read the affidavits and
memorandums on file; it having also heard the parties' oral stipulation that plaintiff is bound
by the terms of her contingency fee arrangement with her counsel, and, in that regard, the
Court having further acknowledged that plaintiff has a one-third (1 /3)/two-thirds (2/3's)
contingency tee arrangement witn her counsel, as sex forth in Exhibit "A1' attached hereto
and incorporated by reference, and good cause further appearing, the Court ruled as
follows:
Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater is hereby awarded a judgment against defendants
Atlas Stock Transfer and Check Rite International, Inc., for attorney's fees in the amount of
one-third (1 /3) of the amount of the judgment entered against such defendants on June 6,
1990, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated into this
judgment by reference as Exhibit "B'\

yd
DATED t h i s / 7 Hay~of September, 1990.

THIRD DISTRICT COURT

Third District Judge (Raymond S. Uno
Approved as to form:

Philip R. Hurfhes
Counsel to Check Rite Intef national. Inc.
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March 22, 1989

Mr. John Michael Coombs, Lawyer
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dear Michael:
I have searched my telephone records and, apparently, have given
you all the information on calls I made to Guardalabene.
I have recieved the most recent offer and find it absolutely ridiculous. As you will note, in previous correspondence I sent to
Guardalabene, dated July 11th, he had proposed over the phone to
pay me the amount I had paid for the stock for settlement, which
was $2,480, and I flatly refused and asked that he just simply replace the stock and allow me to sell it at whatever price I chose.
That is why I am so adamant about their paying me the highest price
the stock traded at plus punitive damages or attorneys fees because
of their unwillingness to settle the matter with me at that time.
I'm not sure we want to go into such detail with Fletcher, but you're
the expert and I will leave that decision up to you. You had mentioned previously about asking for a Summary Judgment. What is your
thinking on that now?
Below I have outlined our agreement the way I believe we discussed
it. If it is satisfactory to you, please make a copy, sign it and
return for my files.
I have previously submitted a $1,500 retainer to you which is to
be deducted from your total fees.
It is' agreed i:hat you are entitled to one third of whatever is recovered. However, it is further agreed that if it is necessary to
go to trial then you will be entitled to half of whatever is recovered. Except if punitive damages are awarded, I will be entitled
to the first $8,000 of whatever is awarded and then we will split
the remainder on a 50/50 basis.

Sinperely,
c

V^£

-^/£&?C><?

lAnna (Broadwater)

Robbins

lr
AGREED AND ACCEPTED THIS

G03£Q

FILED B1STRIST 30c?HT
Third Judicial District
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South. Suite 220
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Plaintiff.

OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business In
Utah. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE.
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f / k / a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident.

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.
The Court having reviewed the file, having heard oral argument on May 1.1990,
including the memorandums and affidavits filed in support of and in opposition to several
motions, the Court being fully advised and good cause further appearing, hereby enters
judgment and further orders as follows:
1. Defendants' motion for summary Judgment on plaintiff's first and second
causes of action is denied.
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2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II of her amended
complaint is granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants Atlas Stock Transfer and Check Rite International, Inc., in the amount of
$10,500.00 with Interest thereon at 10% per annum since July 31,1988. Pursuant to Rule
54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure plaintiff is hereby awarded costs. Further,
pursuant to §15-1-4, Utah Code Ann., interest shall accrue on this judgment from the date
of its entry at the rate of 12% per annum. The matter of plaintiff's attorney's fees is taken
under advisement and will be ruled upon after the submission of a detailed affidavit in
support of such an award.
3. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for an
order striking the affidavits of plaintiff. Chuck Burton, Potter Investment Company, and
Penny Grace is denied.
4. Defendant Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion to strike
certain portions of plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment and plaintiff's memorandum in support of her motion for partial
summary judgment is granted.
5. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for
summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in her
amended complaint as against them is granted, but any award of attorney's fees is denied.
6. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions against the insurance company defendants
and their counsel is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
DATED this (y*

day of June, 1990.
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In re:

Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, et al.
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Third District Court

Judge Raymond S. Uno
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EXHIBIT "3"
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South. Suite 220
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833
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V.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER.
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN
SUPPORT OF HER MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTS
I AND II OF HER AMENDED
COMPLAINT

Plaintiff.
v.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE.
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f / k / a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident.

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
)ss.
)

LeAnna Broadwater, on her oath, deposes and says as follows in Support of
her Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint:
1. That your affiant is the sole plaintiff in the above-matter and she has
personal knowledge and experience as to that which is contained herein.
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2. That your affiant has carefully read and helped prepare the Statement of
Undisputed Facts in her Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment on
counts I and II of her Amended Complaint and in fact, she personally participated in the
drafting thereof. That in an effort not to duplicate each of such enumerated Facts as
detailed therein in this affidavit, your affiant can attest that each and every such Statement
of Undisputed Fact therein as it pertains to her and her knowledge and experience as to
how she was mistreated, misled, and "lulled" by certain of the defendants and, as to what
otherwise transpired in this case, is true and correct in all particulars.
3. That your affiant can attest that had she had a replacement certificate for
Certificate 258 at July end/August beginning 1988 she would have sold it. She further
believes that she would have received the highest price that such stock reached in 1988,
namely, $1-5/16ths per share, or, at a minimum, at least $1.25 per share. This is because
your affiant knew of a pending Check Rite merger and she also had a brokerage account
with Ernest Muth and was daily, if not very closely, following the price of the stock at that
time. For instance, your affiant would have had an open order placed in which to sell the
stock at that time. On the other hand, your affiant believes that had she had a replacement
certificate at such time, she may have well received $1-5/16ths per share as set forth in the
supporting affidavit of Penny Grace. Thus, your affiant believes that she is entitled to at
least $10,000 in damages (8.000 shares x $1.25 per share) and perhaps $10,500 in damages
(8,000 shares x $1-5/16ths per share). Your affiant further believes that she is entitled to
pre-judgment interest at the highest legal rate or at a rate of no less that 12% and in her
Amended Complaint she has indeed asked for pre-judgment interest. Lastly, your affiant
has incurred attorney fees of at least $10,000 just trying to protect and enforce her rights,

003SC

and she believes that such incurred fees have caused her additional damage which would
not have occured but for the wrongful conduct of the insurance company defendants and
defendants Atlas and Check Rite.
4. That your affiant believes that the defendants (with the exception of
defendant Fletcher) had a duty to make her whole, a duty which included immediately going
out into the market in May 1988 and buying 8,000 shares of stock to replace Certificate 258
on which a lost instrument bond had been posted. That the misfortune of this entire case is
that no responsible entity or person would help your affiant in any way and no one wanted
to take responsibility for the problem until there was nothing left to do but file a lawsuit —
and even then, the defendants would rather spend more money litigating this case than
giving your affiant what she truly deserves.
5. That your affiant believes that Guardalabene's investigation of the matter
was exclusively for his own employer and Fletcher, the principal on the bond, and had
nothing to do with her inasmuch as she is and was a totally innocent victim. That your
affiant believes that Atlas, Check Rite, and the insurance company defendants have no
excuse not to have immediately purchased 8,000 shares of replacement stock in May 1988
and thereafter and immediately delivered the same to her.
6. That your affiant does not believe that she had an obligation to go out and
"cover", namely, to go out into the market herself and with her own money buy replacement
stock for four reasons: (1) the problem was not her fault, (2) no one ever told her to "cover"
or do anything else at any time, (3) she did not have the resources or cash on hand to have
so bought replacement stock herself, and (4) she was not "short" the stock herself, namely,
she had not sold it to or by or through anyone else and therefore she had no duty herself to
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deliver 8,000 shares of replacement stock to any third party. That your affiant believes that
had she been "short" 8,000 shares herself then she arguably would have had a duty to
"cover", but under the circumstances of this case, she did not. That if anyone involved in
the case had simply informed your affiant that your affiant should have "covered" — just to
avoid this lawsuit your affiant would have done so. Unfortunately, no one did and your
affiant had no reason to think she was acting other than as reasonably as could be
expected of anyone.
7. That your affiant has incurred additional damages of substantial
unwarranted attorney fees, costs, including out-of-pocket expenses, and time expended
and she believes that she is entitled to such additional damages on which there should be an
evidentiary hearing.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED t h i s ^ d a y of February, 1990.

££^J^^^^

Broadwater) Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me thi

Febrwtary^ggQ

tJjJlji
at Salt Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires:

B:AFDVT.8
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EXHIBIT "4"

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South. Suite 220
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

c^JwSfy*^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER.
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS*
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff.
v.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE.
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f / k / a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident.

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
)ss.
)

LeAnna Broadwater, on her oath, deposes and says as follows in opposition to
certain defendants' February 6. 1990. motion for partial summary judgment on Counts I and
II of her amended complaint:
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1. That your affiant is the sole plaintiff in the above-matter and she has
personal knowledge and experience as to that which is contained herein. That your affiant
incorporates by reference her affidavit filed in support of her cross-motion for summary
judgment on Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint.
2. That your affiant disputes the defendants' calculation of a "reasonable time"
as set forth in their memorandum in support of their motion for partial summary judgment.
That your affiant believes that she could not have acted more reasonably under the facts
and circumstances of this case and she believes that defendants Atlas, Check Rite,
Northwestern National, and Old Republic did not. That in fact, none of the responsible
parties would assist her or do anything to resolve the problem and in fact there was nothing
she could do under the circumstances other than eventually file this lawsuit.
3. That your affiant believes that the conduct of the above-mentioned
defendants "lulled" her into thinking that they would resolve the matter when they would not
and did not. and if the Court invokes a "reasonable time" period after the conversion and
notice of conversion, such a period should be tolled or extended by virtue of the
misconduct of the above-named defendants — certainly not by any conduct on your
affiant's part. That less than 90 days after the alleged date of conversion is a "reasonable
time" in this case because your affiant acted reasonably during all that period and she does
not know how it is possible that she could have acted more reasonably or diligently. That
your affiant believes that no reasonable person in her shoes would have acted any
differently and certainly no one. under the same circumstances, would have thought that he
or she had an independent duty to effect "cover" and buy replacement stock, especially
when no defendant informed your affiant of such and such only became an issue after this
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case was filed. That your affiant believes that no reasonable person would have spent
several thousand dollars of his or her own money buying replacement stock when any such
person, and your affiant in particular, is the sole victim of the gross negligence,
malfeasance, misfeasance, and overall intentional conduct of the defendants.
4. Because your affiant acted reasonably and the culpable defendants did not,
a "reasonable time" after the conversion and notice of conversion should include a time
period up to and until July end/August beginning 1988 when the price of Check Rite stock
admittedly attained its highest price of $1-5/16th per share.
5. Lastly, your affiant should add that during one conversation with
Guardalabene, Guardalabene tried to get your affiant to deal directly with Fletcher to
resolve the problem. Your affiant responded that she did not think such was her
responsibility. At that point, Guardalabene informed your affiant that because she was a
"layman" and apparently didn't understand the situation, she should get a lawyer. Your
affiant then understood Guardalabene to say that he would no longer deal with her directly
until she consulted with legal counsel and had him talk directly to Guardalabene. Your
affiant can attest that after she retained counsel, who in fact tried to negotiate
unsuccessfully with Guardalabene, Guardalabene was still unwilling to resolve the problem
and therefore, Guardalabene caused your affiant to incur unwarranted and unjustified
attorney fees, not only prior to filing suit, but thereafter as well.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this/Jptay of February, 1990.

-3-

GOl

My Commission Expires:

B:AFDVT.9 '
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EXHIBIT "5"

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South. Suite 220
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER.
AFFIDAVIT OF CHUCK BURTON
Plaintiff,
v.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE.
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC., f / k / a CARDINAL
ENERGY CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident.

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

STATE OF COLO.
COUNTY OF

)
)ss.
) '

CoU> <lffOO
^EIHU&Z

Chuck Burton, on his oath, deposes and says as follows:
1. That your affiant has personal knowledge of that which is contained herein.
That during July and August 1988 your affiant was employed as an account executive with
^•towaSwawokri, a securities broker-dealer in Denver, Colorado.

2. That during the time your affiant was an account executive with^fober

J-=*sT

Fjnannial, it made a "market" in the stock of Check Rite International, Inc.
3. That your affiant recalls a conversation he had with Plaintiff LeAnna
Broadwater some time in July 1988 in which she sought a quote on the stock of Check Rite.
4. That your affiant specifically recalls a transaction at Kober Financial in

((7&

which a sale of Check Rite stock occurred at $1 3/8 per share, exclusive of commissions.
5. That your affiant blieves and recalls that such transaction occurred at July
1988 end or early August 1988 and such was soon after your affiant's telephone
conversation with Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this J8_day ofWgguat, 1989.

^ppraii

flacks

. 'MM f§uc ^
uck Burton

H

_
X

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me thislSth day of /^§ttSt, 1989.

Notary Public
Residing at Denver, Colorado
My Commission Expires:

11 [2. /*?

<$T7rTZ: <SF C o O * M D o
GOOIJIV OP

A^fPnoe-
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EXHIBIT "6"

r' JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

Vjjy

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER,
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT OF
PENNY G. GRACE

Plaintiff.
v.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE,
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC., f / k / a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident.

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

Attached hereto in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on
Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint is the Affidavit of Penny G. Grace, Assistant Vice
President of Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc.
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/M^WONSECURfTlES INC.
333 CHESTERFIELD CENTER BLDG., SUITE 100, CHESTERFIELD, MISSOURI 63017

314 532-2400

August 8, 1989

Mr. Michael Coombs
72 East-400 South
Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dear Mr. Coombs:
In regard to your inquiry on the Checkrite stock, I can
attest to the fact that I have been purchasing Checkrite
stock for clients since September 17, 1987. I have
purchased these shares for clients at various prices. The
highest price I paid for the stock was at 1-5/16 on
July 28, 1988 when I purchased 20,000 shares of Checkrite
for various clients.
I have enclosed my business card.
I can be of further assistance.

Please let me know if

Very truly yours,

Penny G. Grace
Asst. Vice President

PGG/kk
STATE OF

/tfsifiur;

COUNTY OF

5TJ-Cu>S

PENNY GRACE BEING DULY SWORN, DEPOSES AND SAYS THAT SHE PERSONALLY
APPEARED BEFORE ME AND SWORE TO THE ABOVE STATEMENT ON THIS

£ZL DAY OF J'jf

, 19^

NOTARY PUBLIC
MY COMMISSIONS EXPIRES A^iy

^f

/<?<?/)
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EXHIBIT "7"

\\\

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER.
AFFIDAVIT OF POTTER
INVESTMENT COMPANY

Plaintiff,
V.

OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE.
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f/k/a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident.

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
)ss.
)

George "John" Potter, being first put on his oath deposes and says as follows
on behalf of Potter Investment Company:
1. That your affiant is a principal of the securities brokerage firm here in Salt
Lake City known as Potter Investment Company. That your affiant has power and authority
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to make this affidavit on behalf of Potter Investment Company. That since the 1950's your
affiant has been in the securities brokerage business and he has been a registered
representative with the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., ("NASD") and the
Utah Securities Division. That he has personal knowledge and experience as to that which is
contained herein.
2. That Potter Investment Company bought certificate 258 from defendant
Scott J. Fletcher and sold the same to plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater. That such certificate
was properly endorsed by Fletcher and properly signature guaranteed as required in the
industry. In the industry such a certificate is known as "street stock" and it was delivered to
and accepted by plaintiff Broadwater on the settlement date of her purchase transaction
with Potter Investment Company. That because Potter Investment Company received
valuable consideration from Ms. Broadwater for her purchase of 8,000 shares of Check
Rite, Potter Investment Company has and would have had no dispute as to whether Ms.
Broadwater then became the true and lawful owner of certificate 258.
3. That sometime in mid-1988, Potter Investment Company learned about
plaintiff's problem with respect to her request of Atlas Stock Transfer, Check Rite's
transfer agent, to transfer and register Check Rite certificate 258 into her name.
4. That sometime in the end of June or the first week of July 1988 your affiant
recalls engaging in a telephone conversation with an individual who identified himself as
Paul S. Guardalabene and who further identified himself as an employee or agent of Old
Republic Surety, the insurance company that had written a lost instrument bond on Check
Rite certificate 258. That your affiant had a lengthy discussion with Mr. Guardalabene
about penny stocks and lost instrument bonds, etc., one that lasted probably at least 30
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minutes or more. That during such conversation with Mr. Guardalabene, your affiant
informed Mr. Guardalabene that penny stocks such as Check Rite were highly volatile and it
was your affiant's suggestion to Mr. Guardalabene that it would be in Guardalabene's best
interest to quickly resolve any dispute with plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater as the stock could
appreciate in value.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this /3 day of February, 1990.

Georde "Johnjf Patter
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before

residing at Salt Lake City. UT
My Commission Expires:

AFDVT.
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EXHIBIT "8"

1 '. U s. V

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639
Attorney for Plaintiff
72 East 400 South. Suite 220
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833

TL3

••.' -r. ?'\ •CP

U i -u~

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

LeANNA BROADWATER.
AFFIDAVIT OF ERNEST MUTH
Plaintiff.
v.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE.
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation, doing business in
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE
INTERNATIONAL INC., f / k / a
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J.
FLETCHER, a Utah resident.

Civil No. 89-0902684-CV
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

SALT LAKE COUNTY

)ss.
)

Ernest Muth on his oath deposes and says as follows:
1. That your affiant is a stock broker employed by Bagley Securities, Inc., and
for several years he has been a registered representative with the National Association of
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Securities Dealers. Inc.. ("NASD") and the Utah Securities Division. That he has persona)
knowledge and experience as to that which is contained herein.
2. That your affiant's firm, Bagley Securities, Inc., undertook transactions in
the securities of Check-Rite from«May through August, 1988. That based on official
records in the possession of Bagley Securities which your affiant has examined, the
following is a list of the highest prices that the stock of Check-Rite was either bought or
sold by Bagley Securities for the period(s) so indicated:
MAY, 1988:
HIGHEST
PRICE

FIRST WEEK:
SECOND WEEK:
THIRD WEEK:
FOURTH WEEK:
JUNE. 1988:
HIGHEST
p, PRICE

FIRST WEEK:
SECOND WEEK:
THIRD WEEK:
FOURTH WEEK:

• *J_

.'bO

Jto.

JULY. 1988:
HIGHEST
PRICE
FIRST WEEK:
SECOND WEEK:
THIRD WEEK:
FOURTH WEEK:

-Jta
1^:
$1.25

AUGUST, 1988:
HIGHEST
PRICE
FIRST WEEK:
SECOND WEEK:

Mo !**•£>

THIRD WEEK:
FOURTH WEEK

UP

TVAP&7

3. To your affiant's best knowledge and belief, the highest price that the stock
traded in Salt Lake City in 1988 was $1.25 per share as evidenced by Exhibit "A" attached
hereto and incorporated by reference, a true and correct copy of a Bagley Securities stock
confirmation.
4. That Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater has a brokerage account with your affiant
and during the latter part of July and the beginning of August, 1988, your affiant was in
regular communication with her about the price of Check Rite stock. That your affiant
believes and is informed that if Ms. Broadwater had had a certificate of Check Rite to
deliver, she would have sold it during the end of July or early August, 1988 when the price of
the Company's stock achieved its highest price in 1988.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this"Z.\ day of January. 1990.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before mfe ttiis^Lqay of Januar
NbtAry PObifc v lUi
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires

AFDVT.3
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